Sentence appeal dismissed for dangerous driving charge, allowed for aggravated assault charge
The Ontario Court of Appeal has found no reason to impose a second conditional sentence for a second charge, given that the appellant already completed an eight-month conditional sentence and a 12-month probation period without incident.
In R. v. Cameron, 2022 ONCA 710, the complainant separated from his wife, whom the appellant started seeing about two years after the separation. The complainant
repeatedly made offensive and disparaging remarks about the appellant and his children and allegedly spied on his ex-wife with equipment surreptitiously installed on her computer.
The trial judge ruled that the prosecution established all the elements of dangerous driving beyond a reasonable doubt, stemming from an incident in July 2017. The incident began when the appellant saw the complainant walking alongside the road, turned his truck around and drove it toward the complainant and his dog, stopped close, and intended to confront and intimidate the complainant.
The judge found that, during the same incident, the appellant caused serious injuries meeting the criteria for aggravated assault. The appellant was very angry and upset with the complainant’s behaviour toward him, his comments about his children, and his treatment of his former wife, the judge said. The appellant acted as the aggressor from the outset, chose to confront the complainant in a dangerous and intimidating manner, and subjected him to a beating that was not proportional to anything the complainant had done, the judge added.
On the aggravated assault charge, the judge imposed a 120-day sentence but postponed the beginning of that sentence for around two months. On the dangerous driving charge, he imposed an eight-month conditional sentence to be followed by 12 months’ probation.
The Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal upon finding that the grounds of appeal essentially asked for a retrial and largely ignored the trial judge’s reasons.
First, the appellant argued that the judge’s finding that the complainant had to move out of the way to avoid the appellant’s vehicle was based on a misapprehension of a neighbour’s video. The appellate court viewed the video and agreed with the judge’s description of what it depicted.
Second, the appellant asserted that the judge’s conclusion that he was angry was based on conjecture and speculation. The appellate court found that there was a great deal of evidence from which the judge could reasonably infer that the appellant was angry.
Third, the appellant claimed that the judge improperly curtailed the cross-examination of the complainant on his alleged installation of spyware on his ex-wife’s computer. The appellate court responded that the judge’s limiting of the cross-examination fell within his trial management powers.
Fourth, the appellant contended that the judge improperly drew an inference of animus against the complainant from the appellant’s after-the-fact conduct. In response, the appellate court said that the inference was reasonably available based on the appellant’s comment to the complainant shortly after the physical confrontation and based on the context in which it was made.
Fifth, the appellant submitted that the judge’s finding that the appellant was the aggressor during the fight was inconsistent with the injuries and with the video evidence. The appellate court determined that the appellant’s and the complainant’s injuries were reasonably capable of supporting the inference that the appellant was clearly the aggressor. The appellate court noted that the video showed the two men fighting but did not much assist in showing the confrontation’s specifics.
The appellate court saw no errors in the judge’s assessment of the complainant’s inconsistencies.
Lastly, the appellate court dismissed the sentence appeal relating to the dangerous driving charge but allowed the sentence appeal relating to the aggravated assault charge. The appellate court varied the sentence for aggravated assault to a suspended sentence.
It was unnecessary to incarcerate the appellant at this point, given the appellant’s background, employment, many positive contributions to the community, and the circumstances that caused him to act out of character, the appellate court said.
